

## PAKISTAN'S POST 9/11 AFGHAN POLICY: IMPACT ON FATA

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### **Abstract**

*In the backdrop of War on Terror in Afghanistan, Pakistan abandoned its two decade long Afghan policy of supporting Taliban, Islamic Jihad, Islamic fundamentalists, and became an ally with US in conducting operations against Al-Qaida and Taliban network in Afghanistan. This change in Pakistan's Afghan policy had deep impacts on country's peace and security, particularly on Pakistan's bordering region with Afghanistan, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Consequently, Pakistan's military conducted several operations from 2002 onwards in FATA. During this period, several peace agreements were conducted between the military and militants in FATA. But such operations and the subsequent agreements failed to prevail peace in border region. Instead, spreading conflicts to other areas of Pakistan.*

*This paper attempts to examine Pakistan's Afghan policy since 2001, and analyze its impact on FATA's peace, security and social fabric. It also critically analyzes the strategies adopted by Pakistan's military in dealing with Pakistan based militant groups and foreign insurgents in FATA.*

*The issue of peace and conflict in FATA needs to be carefully addressed because this is a porous and fragile area that exists between Afghanistan and Pakistan. FATA's volatile geography makes it more violent and resistant to international aid, Counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics, and development, which has direct impact over peace and development of Pakistan.*

*The methodology employed is qualitative and analytical. First half lays out the independent variable by describing US, Pakistani and militant action post 9/11. Second half lays out the dependent variables by describing socio-political and economic changes in FATA.*

*This study concludes with recommendations regarding prevailing peace in FATA. The finding of this study shall help in framing future Pakistan's Afghan policy.*

**Keywords:** FATA, Militants, Terrorism, Jihad, Al-Qaeda, 9/11, Afghanistan, Allies

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## **Introduction**

The incidence occurred on September 11, 2001 resulted in declaration of US Global War against Terrorism on Afghanistan. Pakistan being an immediate neighbour of Afghanistan also had to play its role in US War on Terrorism in Afghanistan. This War brought very strong repercussions for Pakistan especially its areas bordering Durand line. War on Terrorism not only affected the peace and stability of FATA but also the social fabric got upset. This instability and continued militancy generated many Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from FATA, others migrated after the operations started by the Army of Pakistan against militants in FATA. It disturbed the normal life of those people and they had to compromise on their comfort and livelihood. Economic activities also got affected and people of FATA lost their means of production. Taliban became the power center of FATA and Political agent lost his hold over the administration. Pakistan's objective of using extremism to gain strategic depth in Afghanistan resulted in losing its writ in FATA and also proved to be unfavorable for its peace, security and stability.

## **Pakistan's Post 9/11 Afghan Policy**

Afghanistan based Al-Qaida global jihadists attacked US on September 11, 2001. Resultantly, Taliban regime collapsed after Afghanistan was attacked by US forces and its Allies. The demise of Taliban regime created fear in Pakistani policy makers of losing Afghanistan to the pro-Indian Northern Alliance. US being very decisive and prompt in its response post 9/11, declared Al-Qaida responsible for the incident. Promptly full scale war against Al-Qaida and their supporters was declared (Hadar: 2002). President Bush expressed US determinacy in eradicating terrorism (Robert: 2001, 25) and formulated policy for that purpose. Main objective of US was complete wiping out of Al-Qaida and their supporters. US attacked on Afghanistan in October 2001 after the refusal of Taliban's regime of handing over Osama Bin Ladin (mastermind behind September 9/11 incident) to US (Sher:2001). US started Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) on Afghanistan and was determined not to spare any state who is not willing to co operate with US (Bush: 2001).

Al-Qaida and Taliban faced lots of casualties and were pushed harshly, but, Osama Bin Ladin could escape successfully (Carrol: 2004). United Nations (UN) played an important role in justifying and legitimizing US and its allies on GWOT and was ready to play its role in peace building activities in Afghanistan (Chitkara, Girdhari: 2002, 53-57)

Due to the changed geostrategic environment and US pressure, Pakistan decided to join Global War on Terror (GWOT) in favour of international operation led by US, in Afghanistan. This decision was taken to adjust to the new global and regional politics (Abbas 2005, 13), the policy of strategic

depth of Pakistan continued. Pakistan selectively cooperated with US in Afghanistan and pursued the policy of its interest of taking control of Kabul through Taliban.

Situation in Afghanistan ten years down of GWOT remains precarious. A strategic control over Afghanistan through religious groups reflects Pakistan's strategic apprehensions in the region and remains the center of Pakistan's Afghan policy (Rubin 2013, 15). As a result of weak performance of Karzai's regime in Afghanistan and overabundance of blunders committed by US and its Allies, Pakistan wanted to protect its interests and objectives in Afghanistan and considered Pakistan's religious groups as best tool for this purpose. Some of these Taliban were sheltered along with their families and were provided safety in camps in Pakistan. Some joined Madrassas, got busy in arranging religious seminars in Pakistan (Rashid 2000, 223).

Moreover, huge assistance to American war was provided by Pakistan in the shape of providing air base facility, intelligence sharing, and installing troops at Pak-Afghan border in order to resist Taliban and Al-Qaida from penetrating in Pakistan. However, eighty thousand military troops were deployed along Pak-Afghan border region. The rationale behind this policy was the concern that forces should not be deployed in bordering region of Balochistan and Waziristan. Subsequently, the Al-Qaida operatives reach Waziristan easily (Rashid 2008, 148). Furthermore, in December 2001, an attack was conducted on Indian Parliament; Pakistani militant group Jesh-e-Muhammad (JeM) based in Pakistan was blamed. This incident resulted in building relations more volatile between Pakistan and India. These tensions compelled Pakistan deploying troops on its eastern border, hence, Al-Qaeda got compatible environment for entering inside Pakistan through its Western border. (Yousaf:28)

Britain and America needed to pay attention to the situation to cool down tension between Pakistan and India; they compelled General Musharaf for destroying the terrorists' safe heavens which he committed to do in his speech in January 2002. This pressure resulted in banning terrorist and extremist activities; however, these groups were not fatally banned or dismantled (Riedel 2011, 68-70). Even this strategy of restricted counteracts terror activities could not control the terror communications as Musharaf himself, in the following years, came under assault from the Al-Qaida connected extremists.

Accumulating economic assistance from US and backing of the military rule in Pakistan, policy makers in Pakistan thought to counter India by securing and increasing nuclear program and to thrive for installing Pakistan friendly government in Afghanistan (Rashid 2008, 148-219). Pakistan's policy makers also thought that non-cooperation can lead to US closeness with India and it will fatally blow Pakistan's security interest and to Kashmir issue. But trust deficit between US and Pakistan enhanced close relations between India and US.

President Musharaf while justifying Pakistan's post 9/11 Afghan policy stated in his interview to BBC that Pakistan's Afghan Policy is absolutely right and the changes incorporated in it is due to the change in circumstances. Moreover, Pakistan supported Taliban before 9/11 incident because they were in control of almost 90% of Afghan land. He also affirmed that this policy will lead to peace and progress of Pakistan and region. US Secretary of State, Collin Powell, after attending meeting of US National Security Council that all cooperation will be provided for arresting and punishing the culprits. Moreover, he showed satisfaction on Pakistan's cooperation with US in GWOT.

Similarly, Pakistan's decision of playing front line role in GWOT was also justified under United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution no. 1373 and under Article no.51 of UN charter. As these UNSC could take military action against the state that refuses to cooperate US and its allies as GWOT is an important step to counter terrorism. Moreover, financing and providing shelter to terrorists and terrorist organizations were also strictly forbidden by UNSC.

Pakistan's military government had to abandon pro-Taliban Policy and ally with US and the world against terrorism as it was the key to national security and sovereignty.

### **Militant's Tactics and Military Operations in FATA**

Pakistan's military played role of frontline state in US led GWOT, post 9/11 in Afghanistan against Al-Qaida and Taliban, however, it could not effectively stop emergence of uprisings and rebellions at the Western border. Similarly, it also could not control entrance and escape of Taliban-led insurgents and Al-Qaida militants in South and north of Waziristan (Grare 2006, 6) porous character of Durand line is the major reason for that.

Owing to these weaknesses, these militants' organizations began reorganizing in FATA in 2004; however, intelligence agencies of Pakistan repeatedly ignored them and denied their presence in the region (Rashid 2012, 46-89). As Pakistan was having clash with India on its eastern border (Smith: 2002, 42) it could not pay required attention on what was happening on its western border. Hence, Al-Qaeda took advantage of this situation and began insurgency in Afghanistan with the logistic support of tribal armed militant organizations. Further to safeguard and justify their presence in FATA, foreign militants persuaded local tribes to form militant groups for waging Jihad against whoever stops them (Rana: 2009,3). Similarly, intelligence officers of Pakistan met some foreign Taliban's leaders, such as Tahir of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU, henceforth), heads of some local jihadi organizations like Jalauddin Haqqani (Rashid 2008, 269). The rationale behind meeting these heads and establishing ideological belt of Taliban at FATA was to gain favour from the Government of Kabul (Smith: 2008).

Pakistani Taliban, until 2004, focused more on recruiting forces (U.S. Department of State, *Diplomacy in Action, South Asia Overview: 2003*) for participating in war against US and its allies in Afghanistan as well as securing themselves from the security operations conducted by the state of Pakistan. They started earning strategic gains after they changed their tactics and started targeting security forces and officials. Similarly, other tactics like strategy of kidnapping government officials, demoralizing security forces by attacking them and later bargaining with the state for the release of their (militants) partners arrested by security forces. Around 1000 security personals had been kidnapped during 2007 and after bargaining Taliban were successful in releasing more than 500 militants. This tactic of kidnapping was the main reason which led to peace talks between State of Pakistan and Taliban. Trade and other economic activities in FATA got worsen which resulted in developing war economy. People started renting their houses and services to militants.

Pakistan for achieving its objective of strategic depth made distinction between Taliban as good and bad Taliban. But this strategy bought terrorism on Pakistan's soil and Pakistan could not save itself from the influence of Taliban-led militants (Paul: 2014, 62).

Colin Powel, the then U.S. Secretary of State, paid a prompt visit to Islamabad in 2004 and notified Musharraf's administration that US would attack South Waziristan in case of Pakistan's failure to attack Al-Qaeda militants, situated at South Waziristan. Following US threat, Musharraf's administration, launched military operations in FATA. For instance, FC unit in Kaloosha, situated at South Waziristan, launched counter militant attack in 2004. Subsequently, a peace deal was signed between eminent tribesmen of Shakai and Musharraf administration, which led to extend and legitimize mullah-military nexus (Shehzad 2011). That deal included: to marginalize traditional Jirga system and get into it to political set up of state, tribal council of elders and local religious clergy and replace them with Taliban to bring them into forefront as representatives of FATA, it was also agreed upon that militants would not attack on any state property and personnel and that militants would also refrain from any action in Afghanistan (Sattar, 2014).

Conversely, the peace deal was proved of assistance to the armed militants and, thus, their terror compelled tribesmen and their elders not to refused to provide support to Taliban. These tribal militants either killed numerous tribal leaders and innocent villagers or made them run away from their home. On the other hand, the military leadership of Pakistan had faced hurdles in countering tribal militancy and, thus, it led to additionally strengthen militants (Rashid 2000, 238-239). As a result, these militants launched their self-styled system of *Sharia* (Rashid 2008, 275). Moreover, they also started FM radio station as propaganda tool and media organ, such as *Al-Saha*, collected funds and recruit men from each and every subsection

of the tribe to expand their activities, established *Sharia* courts, banned sources of the government, forced tribal people girls to marry their daughters with to militants and destroyed numerous schools (Rashid 200,239-240).

Some militant groups residing in agencies of Mohmand and Orakzai in FATA, Tank, Banu were making their finances by involving in criminal actions, such as, kidnapping for ransom, killings, taxes on trade and transportation etc (Rana 2009,9). These Non-State actors were aiming at destabilizing Pakistan. In FATA and Swat, they have not only murdered 400 Maliks but also civilians, religious leaders and personals of security forces were killed by them (Parveen, Khalil, & Shah, 2014). The State of Pakistan wanted to control and calm the situation by initially conducting peaceful dialogues. Subsequently, a peace deal was signed between eminent tribesmen of Shakai and Musharraf administration, which could not control the activities of Taliban in FATA (Rana & Gunaratna 2008, 71). Hence, calming down the hostilities of Pakistani Taliban, State of Pakistan decided to conduct massive operations to deal with the situation. Operation Sher-Dil in Bajaur on September 9, 2008. In April 26, 2009, operation named Operation Rah-e-Rast, in Swat valley. Safe havens' of militants in Orakzai Agency were dismantled by the air strikes in Bara, the Operation *Sirat-e-Mustakin* (the path of the righteous) was conducted, as a lot of killings of minorities were done by the militants. On 2<sup>nd</sup> May, 2011 Operation Koh-e-Sufaid was launched in Kurrum Agency (Parveen, Khalil, & Shah, 2014, 239-252), and then Operation Zarb-e-Azab was started in June 24<sup>th</sup>, 2014, in North Waziristan. Operation Zarb e Azab though reduced the number and influence of Taliban in North Waziristan. These militants found safe shelter in Kunar (Afghanistan) mostly and went there. But victory against militancy cannot be claimed by the security forces as various military outfits are still presently working, such as, Uzbekistan Islamic Movement, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, Lashkar-i-Khorasan, Jamat-ud-Dawa, Lashkar-i-Jhagvi etc (Mehmood & Azeem 2007).

The retaliation of militants towards the operation Zarb-e-Azab was extremely heartless. They killed 135 students of an army run school based in Peshawar. Whole nation was grieved and international community mourned with Pakistan (Nahyan 2016, 51-52). This tragic day in December 2014 was declared as "*a national tragedy day unleashed by savages*", by the Prime Minister of Pakistan (Dawn, 2014). Military courts were established as a response to militarism and within one year 2,763 militants were killed and around 90000 submitted (Shahid, 2015).

Major concern faced by the State of Pakistan was the efficient settlement of internally displaced people (IDPS) after military operations conducted in FATA. These offensive military operations ended in creating major security and humanitarian problems. Consequently, 298,600 families displace from FATA according to the FATA Disaster Management Authority. Managing these IDP'S and then returning them safely back home

was a challenge for civil and military administration of the state. But International agencies and State both could not fulfill this task (Shinwari 2010, 40). FATA, Research Center in 2013 stated researching on the major problems IDPs were facing and found out that most of the problems were related to children and women, like, health, hygiene, loss of identity, food problems and lack of shelter.

US for targeting foreign and local militants in FATA started using Drone. Obama administration emphasized more on drone attacks with introduction of signature strikes, than Bush's administration. Obama, in 2013, implemented the rules for relying more on intelligence information in these drone attacks to avoid civilian casualties but lots of civilian lost their lives as it was declared by US that "*proposed targets are imminent to threats to US*" (Entous 2015). Though, many militants were killed in drone attacks but Al-Qaida kept on recruiting new militants from FATA. From 2005 till April 2013, according to South Asian Terrorism Portal around 270 drone attacks were reported which resulted in killing 2496 people.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, in the wake of drawdown of US forces from Afghanistan, US would use drone strategy for attacking militant hiding in FATA.

Pakistan supported USA in catching several militants of Al-Qaida and numerous were also arrested from the major cities of Pakistan with the support of CIA (Hussain, 122-140). Militants, who were involved in attack on Parliament of India, escaped and found safe refuge at Azad Kashmir or FATA (Haque, 11). Militants kept finding refuge in tribal belt of Pakistan, For instance, Al-Jazeera TV exposed that leader of Al-Qaida, along with his vicegerent Ayman Alzawhiri, was seen roaming around the mountainous South Waziristan in 2003 (Rashid 2008, 270).

## **Pakistan's Participation in War on Terror: Socio-Political Impact on FATA**

Frontier Crime Regulations (FCR)<sup>2</sup> deals with Law in FATA. It gives Political, Administrative and some sweeping judicial powers to Political Agent (P.A) appointed by the government in center of any agency. FCR gives inclusive power to the P.A of arresting any or all members of the tribe

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<sup>1</sup> South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP), Drone attack in Pakistan: 2005-2015.

<sup>2</sup> Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) comprises a special set of laws of Pakistan which are applicable to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of northwestern Pakistan. The law states that three basic rights are not applicable to the residents of FATA – *appeal i-e*, the right to request a change to a conviction in any court., *wakeel* the right to legal representation i-e, and *daleel* i-e, the right to present reasoned evidence, respectively. The FCR has its origins in the Murderous Outrages Regulation (FOR) which was enacted by the British Empire to prosecute crimes in British India. The Murderous Outrages Act 1877 was specifically devised to counter the opposition of the Pashtuns to British rule, and their main objective was to protect the interests of the British Empire. The laws are currently applied by the Government of Pakistan to FATA residents.

whose member has committed crime. Moreover, actions taken by P.A could not be challenged in any High Court, Supreme Court or any Court of Law (Sabri:1999,202) P.A possessed an absolute authority in political and administrative sphere. The main instrument through which P.A controls his Political Agency and administration are Maliks<sup>3</sup> of the Tribe. For attainment of loyalty and favour of these Maliks, they are paid and privileged by P.A. these privileges includes hospitals, jirga Halls, Schools, jobs in Khasadar force. Such government institutions granted to them were either used as guest house/ rooms or they used to sell them further.(Focus on FATA: 2005, 4) Hence, Maliks serve as a bridge between P.A's administration and tribes. They not only played role of the mouth piece of P.A, conveyed their messages and decisions to their people but also did spying for the P.A. Consequently, conducting such significant tasks for the political administration in agencies makes these Maliks influential and plays a very important role in local jirgas<sup>4</sup>(Khan, 78).

Under FCR, in tribal system any debatable issues raised between political administrations of the relative agency with tribesmen of that agency, are resolved by jirga system. These influential Maliks in actual practice just used to read out the verdict in jirgas and these verdicts were handed to Maliks by P.A.

Post 9/11, Pakistan decided to side along US and its allies in War against militants of Al-Qaida and Taliban in Afghanistan. These militants after facing aggression in Afghanistan started moving across the border through porous border they share with Pakistan. FATA, located on Durand line became best option for Taliban to convert it in their camp for further planning (Washington Post: 2007, 3).

Tension mounted on Indo-Pak border around 2002 and Pakistan stopped deploying its army on western border, it also gave a good chance to Taliban for establishing allies with local tribes in FATA. (Rashid: 2010, 148) Taliban wanted support and favour of locals in FATA; they started punishing/hanging criminals and dacoits. They threw the image of implementing true Islam. Taliban in FATA banned internet, television and setup their own Courts and administration. A recruitment office was setup in Wana (South Waziristan) (Zahid Hussain: 2010, 97).

Since long FATA was deprived of their rights and privileges by the government that is the reason they found relieve in Taliban's Amir Court (Zahid Hussain: 2010, 97).

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<sup>3</sup> Malik is the leader of the Tribe in FATA. Yet doesn't possess absolute powers. Several factors for the attainment of the title of Malik are: experience, charismatic personality, inter-personal communication skills, wealth, family back ground and influence and approval of government .

<sup>4</sup> A formal meeting called by the tribal elders for the settlement of disputes, with the power to impose penalty on both the disputed parties.



Political Administration of P.A in FATA was replaced by Court of Taliban's Amir. Amir's Court had Shura which was comprised of Ulema who used to interpret Islamic Law in accordance with local traditions and customs (The Frontier Post: 2006). These courts soon gained confidence of tribal people by providing speedy justice to them. Taliban's position strengthened in FATA. Subsequently, Taliban to further strengthen their positions had to get rid of Maliks and Political Agents. Courts of Amir commenced jihad by claiming all Maliks and political Agents corrupt. They were then killed or kidnapped for ransom by Taliban (Shah Sikandar, 2005). Consequently, Amir became the chief of maintaining Law and Order in FATA. Eventually, the power struggle was won by the Mulla from Maliks, resulting in ending the power system exercised by Maliks and Political Agents setup by British government (Shah Sikandar, 2005).

### **Impact on Society**

FATA, due to lack of urbanization, illiteracy, absence of modern institutions and detachment from national mainstream remained more traditional and rigid in their practices. Pakhtunwali<sup>5</sup> is very religiously practiced in FATA. Post 9/11 changes in the region also brought changes in Pakhtunwali and some new and abrupt trends were also inculcated in the tribal societies of FATA (Economist: 2007). People in tribal belt were inclined towards the sharia state installed in Afghanistan during Taliban era. Later, post 9/11 the presence of these Taliban in Tribal belt and their imposition of Islam according to their own interpretation repelled people and their ideological inclination towards Taliban rule reduced.<sup>6</sup>

### **Extremism**

FATA was comprised of Pathans who were comparatively more peaceful than Pathans residing in settled areas. Moreover, the crime rate in FATA was lesser than the developed areas. Regardless, of the fact that during Soviet war in Afghanistan, US flooded FATA with dollars and jihadi

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<sup>5</sup> Pathan community as a whole and FATA in particular is hosts to hundreds of customs and traditions. They take pride in their code of life. This code of life is known as Pakhtunwali. Pakhtunwali consists of some common habits and practices like , Melmastia (Hospitality), Nanawati (application of mercy/ status of forgiveness), Badal (revenge) the only way to avoid Badal is Nanawati, Naang (courage, generosity, grace), Ghairat (courage to protect one's own rights or tribe's prestige), Marrana (bravery), Jirga (formal meeting called by Tribal elders for the settlement of disputes with the power to impose penalty on both the disputing parties), Athanr (special tribal dance), Badi (animosity), Badraga (if anyone happens to move through the tribal territory, his protection is the responsibility of that tribe through which he moves), Cheegha (constituting a team of tribe).

<sup>6</sup> Personal interview from Danishver Afridi, Associate Professor in University of Peshawar, belongs to Gaum (tribal area) and research scholar.

groups were indulged into jihad, they remained peaceful but religious extremism kept rising (Ahmad: 1983).

These jihadi groups fought for US objectives in Afghanistan, later after Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan; these groups became active for attainment of Strategic Depth a long term determinant of Pakistan Afghan policy, in Afghanistan. But, post 9/11 Pakistan joining GWOT of US against Al-Qaida, this strategy of Strategic Depth was initially kept aside (Hilali: 2005, 249). Pakistan, Post 9/11 decided not only to fight for US but also agreed on sharing intelligence, providing logistic support for trekking and handing over Al-Qaida members and Taliban to them. This situation was alarming for Al-Qaida and Taliban and they started crossing long and porous Pak-Afghan border, making tribal belt of Pakistan as their new base. These jihadis were comprised of not only native Taliban but also foreign jihadis (Christine.Nicholas:2006, 2).

US pressure, asking and expecting “Do more “from Pakistan Army became intense and resulted in operation in FATA(discussed in above).These operations and drone attacks by US in FATA resulted in killing innocents there. Consequently, anti-US feelings and hatred for Pakistan’s Army started flourishing. In the meanwhile, Jihadi propaganda by militants through Radio in FATA commenced, which resulted in converting the minds of illiterate and innocent people to believe and strive for Badal (Spain: 1963, 64) against Pakistan Army. They challenged the Government’s writ and attacks over security forces and kidnapping of government servants started taking place. Hence, extremism and violence became so intense that the area which was previously peaceful turned into war zone.

## **Impact over Social Practices**

### **Enmity**

Tribal men being illiterate used to be involved in inter tribal fueds and enmity. They used to be in fueds with their cousins (Tarboors). With the rising of Taliban’s influence in tribal area, those tribes who were weak in front of their Tarboor found chance of increasing their strength by joining Taliban. On contrary, it also complimented Taliban’s rise and strength in FATA. These weak tribals got strength form Taliban and could easily take revenge from their Tarboor either by killing or kidnapping them. Destabilizing the economic strength and position of Tribes according to their wishes became easy for them (Frontier Post: 2007).

FATA is a mountainous area. Several tribes lives on mountains and at times enmity arises on the claim of ownership of the mountain. This enmity is based on Tribal’s intra-fueds “Wesh” means division on inheritance (Spain: 1972, 89). Such ownership claims are decided by jirgas if not, they

remained disputed. Amir of Taliban post 9/11 resolved or intensified these claims on the basis of their own interest.

### **Status of Women**

Under tribal practices women play no role in decision making, economic fields' etc. Tribal society has always been a male dominating society. In plain parts of FATA women observed strict "Purdah" means veil (IPRI: 2008, 31). In contrary, those parts of FATA which are mountainous, women used to go to "Gudaar" a place consisting of natural water reservoirs to fetch water. They also used to go out for the purpose of collecting woods for lighting fire for cooking. Hence, there were hardly some restrictions over the movement of women in these mountainous areas. Though, women there kept conducting their duties in accordance to the wishes of male members of their family. Though, they used to move freely but no one could dare to intrude in the honour of women due to strict tribal practices and tribal codes which cannot even hesitate in granting death penalty if someone spoils the chastity of women.

Some practices regarding women used to be observed like if anyone in a family kill someone from another family, and then the jirga decide the punishment Qisa, Deyat or Swara for the family of the culprit. That particular punishment will be granted by the family of the deceased. Swara, is when the assassins family gives the hand of woman from their family to the family of deceased (Hussain: 1990, 30). This practice compels women to bear the punishment of the crime which she has never committed. FATA women in some parts of Tribal areas were also sold like a commodity. The amount paid for a woman is dependent upon how active she is in different household tasks, her beauty also compliments in her value. This practice is known as "Sar", means head money or bride's money. If a woman is a divorce she could still be sold but her price reduces. Polygamy is a normal practice in tribal society.

After Pakistan's participation in crushing militants with US in Afghanistan and then movement of Taliban in FATA and establishment of Amir's court, practices related to women altered abruptly. Amir of Taliban imposed strictness on purdah and movement of women. Previously, the head money for a woman ranged between PKR 1-2 lakhs, but Amir fixed this money at PKR 80,000 .He also claimed that this head money should be considered as a dowry which should be paid to her guardian instead of her. Engagements of infants by their families were declared null and void by Taliban Amir and he claimed that such practices were against the Islamic rights granted to people. Under Taliban's influence a choice to the divorced women is given of either leading her life at her Father's or Brother's place or she wants to re-marry. If she opts for re marrying then she should be married in her previous in-laws.

Swara was also banned by Taliban. Women could only commit legal marriages and could not be used as a commodity under Taliban's administration. As a punishment for crime only options given to the deceased family was Diyat, Qisas and forgiveness. Women though were kept within four walls of their house but were also granted some basic rights which they were deprived off earlier.

### **Arms Carrying Custom**

FATA have never changed and developed in political, constitutional and legal sphere, reason being ruled under FCR, Since it was installed in 1901. Moreover, state does not take responsibility of protection of fundamental rights of tribes and of its people. Consequently, people of FATA protect their rights themselves. This leads to carrying of arms and weapons with them when they move around. Hence, possession and carrying of arms has become a common practice there (Shinwari: 2008, 45).The arms tribals used to carry ranged from the simplest dagger to the most modern arm, i-e, kalashnikov popularly known as AK-47. Carrying these arms was also considered as a symbol of status. But, using these arms was not very common as the code of conduct of FATA brings strict repercussions then.

Arms sophistication in FATA started post Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (ibid, 46).factories of arms and weapons were installed in most of the agencies. Miran Shah, headquarter of North Waziristan Agency and Derra Adam Khel are quite famous for the production of arms and its dealing.

Post 9/11, conventional arms like dagger and rifle were replaced by high quality explosives and suicide jackets. It was then used by the militants for target killing, public slaughtering and suicidal attacks.

### **Education**

Government of Pakistan never took educational system in FATA seriously. That is the reason that the improvement in educational system in FATA was very slow. There were thousands of primary, middle and high schools in FATA. But, instead of using them for educational purposes they were either given by P.A as a bribe to Maliks of the particular agency or sell to them in order to gain their favour and cooperation. These Maliks used to become owner of the building famously known as Malik-i-Makan there.(Rahmanullah:2007)the literacy rate in FATA was 17%, out of that female literacy rate was just 3% .(ibid)

Teaching staff in FATA was more obedient to Maliks because they had power to transfer them according to their will. These schools were used as Hujras (place for guests). Many schools in FATA were ghosts' schools. Though these schools used to get their funds for repairing, furniture and other educational purposes. Ghost schools kept withdrawing their salaries. Since,

female education system was not very popular and supportive there, girls schools were not functioning. Secondly, female teachers appointed there were mostly not local, and living in FATA was not very easy and accessible for them.<sup>7</sup>

Post 9/11, Taliban after taking refuge in FATA from the aggression of US and its allies in Afghanistan targeted schools mostly. They specially focused more on girl's schools. Taliban declared female education unislamic (Hussain Zahid: 2010, 97). Taliban blew many girls school.

Government servants appointed there in FATA, were warned by Taliban for performing their duties. Ultimately, all educational activities and institutions were closed down by Taliban(FATA: 2006).

Taliban's basic focus was on religious based education focusing more on jihadi curriculum and literature. To fulfill their objective they established chains of Madrassas where religious teaching based on jihadi curriculum was taught. Moreover, training centers for jihad were established throughout FATA (Maleki:2009).

### **Economic Life**

FATA has mountainous terrain. It has small pieces of land between mountain, crops like wheat, Maze, Rice, Sugarcane and fruits like orange, apple, peach and dates were produced there. Some dry fruits like nuts and chalgosas. The climate of FATA is suitable for agriculture but the terrain is not. Those small pieces of land between the mountains were cultivated by farmers. They used to earn their bread and butter from farming. Other common means of earning livelihood apart from farming was small business, daily wagging as a worker or shop keeper (FATA:2006).

Post GWOT, 2001, FATA faced in secured scenario for life and property distracted economic activities of residents there. Taliban for raising funds for the purpose of jihadi activities started imposing tax on the tribals, who were indulged in any kind of business or work.

The economy of FATA turned into war economy people joining Taliban for any rank or activity/task were paid by Taliban. Those tribals who lend their houses to the members of Al-Qaida organization were paid heavy rents. Those tribals who were helping Taliban either local or foreigner were becoming rich (Frontier Post: 2007). Hence, those Tribals helping in providing safe sanctuary to Taliban or any other task for them became rich and powerful, and they used their power for killing any one.

Post 9/11 smuggling routes for exploitation of Trade Transit agreement of Afghanistan<sup>8</sup> were illegally either re-exported or sold in Pakistan.

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<sup>7</sup> Personal interview with Khaddim Hussain,(2017, May 15) , managing Director at Bacha Khan Trust, Academic writer and was present during Shakai peace agreement between state and terrorist in tribal belt.

<sup>8</sup> Afghan Transit Trade Agreement, under which goods may be imported duty.

### Total Schools Destroyed

Agency/Region	Boys	Girls	Total
Bajaur	68	27	95
Mohmand	66	22	88
Khyber	31	27	58
Kurram	45	16	61
Orakzai	23	11	34
North Waziristan	23	9	32
South Waziristan	29	6	35
FR Peshawar	11	4	15
FR Kohat	17	15	32
FR Tank	2	2	4
FR Lakki	2	2	4
Total	317	141	458

**Source:** FATA Research Centre

**Note:** The schools destroyed include primary, middle, high and secondary schools and a college.

### Conclusion

Pakistan's post 9/11 Afghan Policy could not fulfill main objectives of Pakistan in Afghanistan such as: non-Pashtuns were empowered post Bonn Agreement 2001 in Kabul, Indian influence in Afghanistan increased in reconstruction and rebuilding of Afghanistan, even Karzai sent his army for training to India. All these actions from India were supported and encouraged by US. Pakistan always aimed at reaching to energy rich Central Asian market but could not attain this objective too as constant militancy and destabilization was a hurdle.

Pakistan's tribal belt bordering Afghanistan is rigid, conservative, politically disorganized, way too behind in development from rest of the state led it to radicalization soon. Resultantly, militancy from across the border defused and started strengthening its roots. Post 9/11, this tribal belt known as FATA not only became hub for Pashtun Taliban but also non-Pashtun Talibans.

Pakistan policy makers thinking that policy of dividing Taliban as good and bad in Afghanistan will be in their favour but this policy option bought all the actors in Afghanistan against Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan started facing isolation in the world; one more objective of Pakistan in joining GWOT remained unsuccessful. Moreover, Pakistan was also targeted and blamed for double game.

Pakistan remained unsuccessful in attaining its interest in Afghanistan by taking lead in GWOT and could not transform its status into strategic

partner of the leading powers in Afghanistan. Pakistan not only faced loss in form of men (security personals, civilians, students) but also economically. Moreover political instability, clash in military and civilian setup, dis harmony in different religious factions, extremism, radicalization in society.

Since US along with its allies decided to drawdown in Afghanistan by 2014 and leaving necessary forces in Afghanistan, gave rise to concern from regional players like China, Iran and Russia, in Afghanistan as they were concerned of Taliban again gaining power and taking over Kabul. This convergence in objective led all these players came on one table with US.

Pakistani policy makers showed shortsightedness in differentiating between good and bad Taliban and developing feeling of apprehension among regional and international players in Afghanistan. Consequently, US after drawdown of its forces from Afghanistan seemed interested in shifting of supply and trade route from Afghanistan to Northern Distribution Network (NDN) in order to reduce dependence on Pakistan. This strategic shifting is not only an attempt to push Pakistan more into international isolation but also Islamabad losing an important card for Afghanistan and US.

Pakistan became victim of its own Afghan policy. Lost its internal peace and security, internationally started getting isolation and bringing its enemy on eastern border closer to US major player in Afghanistan. Pakistan should reconsider its Afghan policy. Pakistani policy makers should start considering about the objective of economic depth as it will enhance Afghanistan's dependence more on Pakistan. Secondly, stable and peaceful Afghanistan should be the aim instead of Plaintiff regime in Afghanistan.

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